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 Ole Wæver’s conceptualization of security as a speech act was one of the most innovative 
theoretical developments in security studies in recent decades. Drawing upon John Austin’s 
concept of ‘illocutionary’ acts— the ‘performance of an act in saying something’—Wæver 
argued that ‘security’ should not be understood ‘as a sign that refers to something more real; the 
utterance [“security”] itself is the act. By saying it, something is done (as in betting, giving a 
promise, naming a ship).’1 From this perspective, when government officials pronounce 
something an existential threat, their pronouncements are to be interpreted as performing the 
threat, successfully or unsuccessfully, rather than as truly or falsely describing a preexisting 
danger. Consider, for example, the seemingly descriptive claim ‘Iraq has weapons of mass 
destruction.’ Whereas standard approaches to security would assess this claim in terms of its 
correspondence to Iraqi reality, Wæver’s securitization theory directs us to analyze how the 
uttering of the claim may itself have constructed a reality of an Iraqi threat.  
 The most striking feature of Wæver’s formulation is the instantaneity of securitization: 
saying ‘security’ is not the first stage of a social process that culminates in a condition of 
emergency requiring special measures (that is, securitization); rather, the uttering of ‘security’ 
and the production of an emergency condition blend into a single ‘event’. 2 Alas, as Stritzel and  
McDonald observed, when Wæver subsequently joined forces with Barry Buzan to create a ‘new 
framework for analysis’, the resulting book—the primary text of the ‘Copenhagen School’—
displayed a marked tension between securitization understood as a linguistic event and 
                                                      
1 John L. Austin, How To Do Things With Words: The William James Lectures Delivered at Harvard 
University in 1955, 2nd edition, ed. J. O. Urmson and Marina Sbisà (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 1975), p. 99, emphasis in original; Ole Wæver, ‘Securitization and Desecuritization’, in Ronnie 
Lipschutz (ed.), On Security (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), p. 55, emphasis in original.  
2 Holger Stritzel, ‘Towards a Theory of Securitization: Copenhagen and Beyond’, European Journal of 
International Relations, 13:3 (2007), p. 359.  
 
 securitization qua social process.3 While the ‘new framework’ echoed Wæver’s 
conceptualization of securitization as an illocutionary act, the text at the same time characterized 
securitization as a ‘process’ that apparently consists of two stages.4 First, a ‘securitizing actor’ 
offers ‘an argument about the priority and urgency of an existential threat’; ‘then’, a ‘significant 
audience’ comes to ‘accept’, or becomes ‘convinced’ by, the argument.5 Rather than evoke the 
logic of illocution—acting ‘in saying something’—this two step formula brings to mind what 
Austin called a ‘perlocutionary’ act—acting ‘by saying something, such as convincing’ or 
‘saying something [that] produces certain consequential effects upon the feelings, thoughts, or 
actions of the audience’.6  
 While the watering down of the illocutionary character of securitization in ‘A New 
Framework for Analysis’ was probably unintended,7 subsequent scholarship on securitization has 
made a deliberate ‘move toward a more processual understanding of security . . . as well as 
[toward] non-linguistic’ approaches.8 For example, Bigo argued that the issue of immigration has 
become securitized not only through successful speech acts but also through the routinized 
                                                      
3 Ibid.; Matt McDonald, ‘Securitization and the Construction of Security’, European Journal of 
International Relations, 14:4 (2008), pp. 563–87; Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, and Jaap de Wilde, Security: 
A New Framework for Analysis (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1998). 
4 Buzan et al., ‘Security’, p. 26 (‘securitization’ as an illocutionary act); pp. 5, 26, 30, 37 (‘process’). As 
Stritzel put it, ‘Wæver and Buzan continuously fluctuate between the terms process and speech 
act/utterance as if both were synonymous’—see Stritzel, ‘Towards a Theory of Securitization’, p. 364,  
emphasis in original.   
5 Buzan et al., Ibid., p. 25 (‘argument’); p. 204 (‘then’); pp. 27, 37 (‘significant audience’); pp. 25, 27, 31, 
34, 41 (‘accept’); p. 41 (‘convinced’). In the words of McDonald, Buzan et al. ‘began to place increased 
emphasis on the role of constituencies or audiences in ‘backing up’ speech acts. . . . Here, speech acts 
were defined as ‘securitizing moves’ that became securitizations through audience consent’—see 
‘Securitization and the Construction of Security’, p. 566.  
6 Austin, How To Do Things With Words, p. 99, emphasis in original; p. 109, emphasis in original; p. 101, 
emphasis added.  
7 As Stritzel pointed out, Wæver continued to champion theorizing securitization as a linguistic ‘event’—
see Stritzel, ‘Towards a Theory of Securitization’, p. 360. 
8 Scott D. Watson, ‘”Framing”’ the Copenhagen School: Integrating the Literature on Threat 
Construction’, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 40:2 (2012), p. 19.  
 
 performance by ‘security professionals’ of a ‘range of administrative practices such as 
population profiling’.9 Balzacq ‘reject(ed) . . . [the] position that securitization is a speech act’ in 
favor of the position that securitization is shaped by ‘context, the psycho-cultural disposition of 
the audience, and the power that both speaker and listener bring to the interaction.’10 Stritzel  
elaborated an understanding of securitization that is ‘less linguistic and more social/structural’ 
than Wæver’s.11 McDonald likewise called for a conceptual framework that would go ‘beyond 
speech’ and ‘beyond the speech act’.12 Watson argued that securitization research ‘should be 
viewed as a subfield’ of the literature on the ‘framing’ of security threats notwithstanding that 
literature’s largely ‘objectivist understanding of reality’.13 Finally, several scholars have 
questioned ‘whether a theory so closely tied to speech . . . is capable of addressing the dynamics 
of security in a world where political communication is increasingly bound with images’.14 In 
this vein, Hansen developed an innovative interpretation of ‘securitizations that run through the 
visual rather than the linguistic’.15 
 In this essay, we want to push back against the retreat from a speech act-centered 
understanding of securitization. It is not that we reject the criticisms articulated by the scholars 
who champion more process-oriented and/or non-linguistic approaches to securitization. We 
share their concerns that the Copenhagen School has ‘undertheorized’ the role of the audience 
                                                      
9 Didier Bigo, ‘Security and Immigration: Toward a Critique of the Governmentality of Unease’, 
Alternatives, 27:1 (2002), p. 65.  
10 Thierry Balzacq, ‘The Three Faces of Securitization: Political Agency, Audience, and Context’, 
European Journal of International Relations, 11:2 (2005), pp. 176, 172. 
11 Stritzel, ‘Towards a Theory of Securitization’, p. 373. 
12 McDonald, ‘Securitization and the Construction of Security’, pp. 568, 570. 
13 Watson, ‘Framing’, pp. 1, 13. 
14 Michael C. Williams, ‘Words, Images, Enemies: Securitization and International Politics’, 
International Studies Quarterly, 47:4 (2003), p. 524, emphases in original. See also McDonald, 
‘Securitization and the Construction of Security’, p. 569, and Watson, Ibid., p. 19. 
15 Lene Hansen, ‘Theorizing the Image for Security Studies: Visual Securitization and the Muhammad 
Cartoon Crisis’, European Journal of International Relations, 17:1 (2011), p. 53. 
 
 and that the Copenhagen School ‘would need a clearer and more elaborated theory of the 
securitizing act’, a theory that would ‘say more about the relative status of the idea of a security 
utterance or speech act event as opposed to the idea of an intersubjectivity of actor and audience 
or the process of securitization’.16 Yet rather than join the critics in moving ‘beyond the speech 
act’, we instead seek to reinvigorate Wæver’s insight that ‘the utterance [“security”] itself is the 
act’.17 We seek, in other words, to rise to the challenge of providing a “clearer and more 
elaborated theory of the securitizing act”.18    
 In the bulk of the essay we thus present a novel theoretical account demonstrating how 
securitization can be understood as an illocutionary act even as it entails a social process. We 
conceptualize the speech of securitizing actors as consisting not in ‘an argument about the 
priority and urgency of an existential threat’ so much as in repetitive spouting of ambiguous 
phrases such as ‘weapons of mass destruction’.19 We propose, further, that the acceptance of this 
oft-repeated utterance by an audience consists not in becoming ‘convinced’ or ‘persuaded’ so 
much as in the audience echoing the phrase, joining in a chorus-like fashion with the securitizing 
actor to produce a repetitive, ritualized chant.20 In our formulation, then, the audience is not 
being performed to—it is not akin to theater spectators who sit inertly in their seats during the 
play before applauding the stage performers at the end of the evening. The audience rather 
partakes in the production of a ‘political spectacle’;21 it comes to actively participate in the 
performance in the manner in which the hearers of a percussion ensemble are moved to tap their 
                                                      
16 McDonald, ‘Securitization and the Construction of Security’, p. 564; Stritzel, ‘Towards a Theory of 
Securitization’, pp. 373, 376, emphases in original.  
17 McDonald, Ibid., p. 570; Wæver, ‘Securitization and Desecuritization’, p. 55, emphasis in original. 
18 Stritzel, ‘Towards a Theory of Securitization’, p. 376. 
19 Buzan et al., ‘Security’, p. 41, emphasis added. 
20 Ibid.; Barry Buzan and Lene Hansen, The Evolution of International Security Studies (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2009), p. 34 (‘convinced’); Balzacq, ‘Three Faces of Securitization’, pp. 
172, 184 (‘persuaded’). 
21 Murray Edelman, Constructing the Political Spectacle (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988). 
 fingers and sway their bodies along with the drumbeat.  Just as the rhythmic beating of drums 
creates a sense of unity even as the minds of individual hearers/performers may wander in 
diverse directions, so does the collective incantation of ambiguous phrases amongst speakers and 
audiences construct a sense of social oneness even as (or rather because) the chanters lack 
consensus about the meaning or policy implications of the phrase. Successful securitization, we 
argue, may be performed through the collective chanting of a phrase that becomes itself the 
existential threat it ostensibly refers to. In sum, we conceptualize securitization as a ritual process 
involving the simultaneous interweaving of linguistic repetitions with speakers’ and audiences’ 
material performances collectively ‘chanting’ the phrase to construct a securitized threat. 
 To illustrate our theoretical account we discuss an empirical case we have already alluded 
to: the securitization of Iraq in the United States in 2002–2003, that is, the elevation of the Iraqi 
issue to the level of ‘panic politics’ or of ‘supreme priority’ that calls for ‘extraordinary means’, 
including war.22 During the run-up to the invasion of Iraq the Bush administration spouted forth, 
as US Senator Lincoln Chafee (Republican, Rhode Island) put it, a ‘steady drumbeat of weapons 
of mass destruction, weapons of mass destruction, weapons of mass destruction’.23 Soon enough 
this phrase became contagious, ceaselessly reverberating throughout the US media. Even as the 
meaning of the term was historically variable, ambiguous, and multivocal, and even as many 
Americans have not heard it before, ‘weapons of mass destruction’ became so ubiquitous that it 
was selected America’s 2002 ‘word of the year’.24 The ritualistic choral chanting of this phrase 
by the administration, the media, and the public constructed, we argue, a heightened generalized 
sense of danger even as many of the chanters did not necessarily support the invasion of Iraq. 
                                                      
22 Buzan et al., ‘Security’, pp. 34, 26.  
23 Esther Schrader, ‘Lawmakers Grill Wolfowitz on Iraq’, Los Angeles Times (30 July 2003). 
24 Benjamin Barber, Fear’s Empire: War, Terrorism, and Democracy (New York: WW Norton, 2003), p. 
29. 
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 The collective incantation of the utterance ‘weapons of mass destruction’ ultimately produced 
the grave Iraqi threat that it ostensibly described.   
 
Theorizing the securitizing speech act 
  Prominent American scholars have conceptualized national security policymaking in 
terms of a ‘marketplace of ideas’.25 In this conceptual framework, government officials 
communicate fact-based (if often exaggerated) arguments that depict external threats and 
propose measures to tackle these threats. The media and academy serve as watchdogs who 
debate the accuracy of the facts and help ‘weed out unfounded, mendacious, or self-serving 
foreign policy arguments’.26 In the wake of the debate the public decides whether to ‘buy’ the 
argument.  
 The ‘marketplace of ideas’ framework evokes a bygone era—if there ever was such an 
era—in which sellers communicated largely descriptive information about their products to 
potential buyers with preexisting tastes. In contemporary mass society, however, the 
‘marketplace’ is characterized less by selling goods than by the aggressive marketing of ‘brands’, 
less by providing fact-based arguments about a product than by fostering consumer identification 
with values symbolized by a brand.27 Arguably the principal characteristic of modern mass 
marketing campaigns—a characteristic ‘so obvious’ that its significance is ‘sometimes 
neglected’—is repetition.28  Advertisers continually bombard us with symbols such as brand 
logos (the Nike swoosh), icons (Marlboro Man; Mr. Clean) and taglines (‘Just do it’; ‘We try 
                                                      
25 Jack Snyder and Karen Ballentine, ‘Nationalism and the Marketplace of Ideas’, International Security, 
21:2 (1996), pp. 5–40. 
26 Chaim Kaufmann, ‘Threat Inflation and the Failure of the Marketplace of Ideas: The Selling of the Iraq 
War’, International Security, 29:1 (2004), p. 5. 
27 See Catherine Johnson, Branding Television (New York: Routledge, 2012), p. 3.  
28 Guy Cook, The Discourse of Advertising (London: Routledge, 1992), p. 227.  
 harder’; ‘Intel Inside’). These images and words are repeated over and over again because, as 
political and corporate consultant Frank Luntz put it, ‘companies learned an important rule of 
successful brands: Message consistency builds customer loyalty. . . Finding a good message and 
sticking with it takes extraordinary discipline but it pays off tenfold in the end’.29 
 The notion of repetition over time brings us close to work that questions the instantaneity 
of Wæver’s formulation of securitization. Bigo, for example, argues that securitization is better 
viewed not as a single moment but as a process that occurs through numerous institutional and 
contextual acts that materially embed securitization efforts. For him, ‘security is constructed and 
applied to different issues and areas through a range of often routinized practices rather than only 
speech acts that enable emergency measures’.30 Immigration, for instance, has become 
securitized not only through speech acts by public officials but through a wide range of border 
control practices.31 Similarly, Huysmans critiques prevailing conceptions of securitization 
because they downplay the role of material practices in productions of (in)security. For 
Huysmans, the main importance of securitizing speech act lies more ‘in the notion of “act” than 
in “speech”’.32 Securitization efforts by elites are reproduced and materialized in the myriad of 
actions and practices taken to carry through security policies. ‘Speech acts of security seem to be 
displaced by the diffuse and associative securitizing work of what from the perspective of 
existential speech acts mostly appear as little security nothings, such as programming algorithms, 
routine collections of data and looking at CCTV footage’.33 
                                                      
29 Frank Luntz, Words That Work: It’s Not What You Say, It’s What People Hear (New York: Hyperion, 
2007), p. 12. 
30 Bigo, ‘Security and Immigration’, p. 65.   
31 Ibid. 
32 Jef Huysmans, ‘What’s in an Act? On Security Speech Acts and Little Security Nothings’, Security 
Dialogue, 42:4-5, p. 372. 
33 Ibid.  
  These insightful conceptualizations of securitization as process rather than as 
instantaneous speech acts have the advantage of broadening the field of analysis to include 
aspects far beyond mere speech. Yet, such criticisms perhaps too quickly move beyond ‘speech’ 
to ‘acts’. We contend that speech act theories have more insights to offer, particularly when 
applied to the repetitive manner in which securitizing phrases (such as ‘WMD’) bounce around 
media and political echo chambers. In the following sections we draw upon the concept of ritual 
as often constituting a key aspect of securitizing processes. This ritual process involves the 
material performances of both the speakers’ repetitive spouting of phrases and audiences 
‘chanting’ the phrase alongside linguistic articulations. The notion of ritual, then, has the 
advantage of drawing together both the linguistic and the material aspects of securitization into a 
single theoretical framework. 
 
Securitization and repetition 
 Repetition is by definition a temporal activity; it takes place over time. Yet, as we noted 
earlier, the most striking feature of Wæver’s formulation of ‘securitization’, indeed the most 
striking feature of any successful illocutionary act, is its instantaneity: saying ‘security’ performs 
securitization at the very moment of the utterance in much the same way that saying ‘I promise 
to do X’ instantly performs a promise. The key to reconciling the apparent tension between the 
instantaneity of illocution and the temporality of repetition lies in recognizing, following Jacques 
Derrida and Judith Butler, that not only is illocutionary speech necessarily characterized by 
conformance to repeatable formulas, repeatability is in fact a condition that makes possible (if 
not necessarily guarantees) the success of illocutionary speech.  
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  That the working of speech acts involves correspondence to repeatable formulas was 
acknowledged by John Austin. In an oft-cited passage he explained that ‘infelicity’, that is, the 
failure of performative speech to do something, ‘is an ill to which all acts are heir which have the 
general character of ritual or ceremonial, all conventional acts’.34 Austin, in other words, 
subsumed speech acts within a larger category of performative acts (including, for example, non-
verbal gestures like bowing), and he implied that the ability of these acts to transform reality was 
a function of their ritualized quality and/or their conformance to conventions.35 Austin, then, 
clearly recognized that the success of words in doing something at the very moment of their 
utterance depended in part on circumstances that preceded (and likely will succeed) that moment. 
For example, ‘I pronounce you husband and wife’ successfully performs a marriage to the extent 
that this act corresponds to a convention that, having been followed time and time again, has 
become sedimented; had this pronouncement not conformed to a ritualized formula, the utterance 
would have ‘misfired’.36    
 As Derrida complained, however, Austin’s understanding of the conventional character 
of performatives was unduly narrow: ‘Austin  . . . appears to consider solely the conventionality 
constituting the circumstances of the utterance (énoncé), its contextual surroundings, and not a 
certain conventionality intrinsic to what constitutes the speech act (locution) itself’.37 Indeed, 
virtually all the illustrations of conventionality supplied by Austin involve extra-linguistic 
conventions—for example, the statement ‘I pronounce you husband and wife’ is successful if it 
                                                      
34 Austin, How To Do Things With Words, pp. 18–19; emphases in original. 
35 Austin later qualified this generalization somewhat, concluding that ‘Illocutionary acts are [always] 
conventional acts, perlocutionary acts are not conventional’—How To Do Things With Words, p. 121, 
emphasis in original. 
36 Ibid., p. 16. 
37 Jacques Derrida, ‘Signature Event Context’, in Gerald Graff (ed.) Limited Inc. (Evanston, IL: 
Northwestern University Press, 1988), p.15, emphasis original. We found Jonathan Culler, On 
Deconstruction: Theory and Criticism after Structuralism (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1982), pp. 
110–34, very helpful in clarifying Derrida’s critique of Austin.   
 is uttered by an appropriate person (say, a priest) in an appropriate context (say, a wedding 
ceremony).  
 Contra Austin, Derrida argued that the conventionality of speech inheres in speech itself. 
Referring to Austin’s claim that speech acts have “the general character of ritual,” Derrida wrote 
that ’”Ritual” is not a possible occurrence (éventualité ) but rather, as iterability, a structural 
characteristic of every [linguistic] mark’.38 In other words, for Derrida, linguistic signs derive 
their performative force from their own inherently repeated quality—their ‘general iterability’—
as much as from conformance to non-linguistic conventions.39 ‘Could a performative utterance 
succeed’, Derrida asked rhetorically, ‘if its formulation did not repeat a “coded” or iterable 
utterance or, in other words, if the formula I pronounce in order to open a meeting, launch a ship 
or a marriage were not identifiable as conforming with an iterable model, if it were not then 
identifiable in some way as a “citation?”’40 Derrida went on to discuss how signatures epitomize 
his claim. The conformance of a signature to a ritualized, repeatable model is the very condition 
that facilitates its validity: ‘In order to function, that is, to be readable, a signature must have a 
repeatable, iterable, imitable form; it must be detached from the present and singular intention of 
its production. It is its sameness which, by corrupting its identity and singularity, divides its 
seal’.41  Indeed, as Culler pointed out, the essential iterability of signatures is brought into sharp 
relief by observing that signatures are valid even when they are (or precisely because they can 
be) produced by a machine.42 In sum, for Derrida a performative utterance is not a ‘singular’ 
                                                      
38 Derrida, Ibid., p. 15, emphasis in original. 
39 Ibid., p. 17. 
40 Ibid., p. 18. 
41 Ibid., p. 20.  
42 Culler, On Deconstruction, p. 126 
 event; its working is not strictly confined to a single, isolated moment.43 The past and future 
repetition of the very same utterance is what makes its performativity possible.  
 This argument was furthered by Judith Butler. Illocutionary utterances, she wrote,  
are not only conventional, but in Austin’s words, “ritual or ceremonial.” As utterances, 
they work to the extent that they are given in the form of a ritual, that is, repeated in time, 
and, hence, maintain a sphere of operation that is not restricted to the moment of the 
utterance itself. The illocutionary speech act performs its deed at the moment of the 
utterance, and yet to the extent that the moment is ritualized, it is never merely a single 
moment. The “moment” in ritual is condensed historicity: it exceeds itself in past and 
future directions, an effect of prior and future invocations that constitute and escape the 
instance of utterance.44  
 
Butler thus clarified a point that was implicit in Derrida’s formulation: characterizing 
illocutionary acts as rituals is tantamount to conceptually stretching the moment of the act along 
the axis of time. Past, present, and (potential) future invocations of the utterance blur into each 
other, forming, to repeat Butler’s elegant formulation, a ‘condensed historicity’. 
 This theoretical insight—the idea that the ‘moment’ of an utterance should not be 
understood literally, that the past and future repetitions of an utterance are condensed into the 
present instance of its invocation—is readily applicable to securitization campaigns. Drawing 
upon Derrida and Butler, we can interpret the repetitive uttering of ‘security’—utterances that, 
when successful, create the danger they ostensibly refer to—as forming an extended ritualized 
moment, a single linguistic ‘event’.45 Understanding securitizing acts in this fashion allows us to 
think of them as occurring continually in time without our having to jettison or weaken Wæver’s 
insight that ‘the utterance itself is the act’. In other words, theorizing the moment of the 
securitizing act as ‘condensed historicity’ makes it possible to preserve an understanding of the 
                                                      
43 Derrida, ‘Signature Event Context’, p. 18. 
44 Judith Butler, Excitable Speech: A Politics of the Performative (New York: Routledge, 1997), p. 3, 
emphasis in original. 
45 Stritzel, ‘Towards a Theory of Securitization’.  
 act as illocutionary even as, or indeed precisely because, we incorporate temporality into our 
theoretical account. 
   To recapitulate, we propose that the speech of securitizing actors may be fruitfully 
analyzed as consisting not in offering arguments so much as in reiterating simplified phrases 
(‘rogue/failed state’; ‘border/homeland security’; ‘ethnic cleansing’; ‘regime change’ ).  
Following Derrida and Butler we argue that the repetitive uttering of these phrases is a condition 
of their performativity. The more constantly and frequently a securitizing phrase is being 
repeated, that is, the more condensed the ‘historicity’ of the phrase becomes, the more likely is 
the phrase to acquire an illocutionary force, to construct the security threat it ostensibly 
describes.46 Such actions are part of an assemblage of linguistic-material processes in which the 
audience facilitates the securitizing efforts of speakers through the ritualistic ‘chanting’ of the 
phrase. This entire ritual of iteration, repetition, and material practice, we argue, should be 
understood as the securitizing process. 
 
Conceptualizing audience acceptance 
 While the ritualized spouting of speech acts by securitizing actors enables the success of 
these acts, it does not guarantee this success. As Buzan and Wæver correctly recognized, for 
illocutionary acts to succeed in creating reality, they must in some sense be accepted by an 
audience: ‘A discourse that takes the form of presenting something as an existential threat to a 
referent object does not by itself create securitization—this is a securitizing move but the issue is 
securitized only if and when the audience accepts this as such’.47 Alas, the Copenhagen School’s 
theorization of audience acceptance was somewhat fuzzy. Even as Buzan and Wæver held fast to 
                                                      
46 Butler, Excitable Speech, p. 36. 
47 Buzan et. al., ‘Security’, p. 25, emphasis in original. 
 the view that securitization was a linguistic event, they appeared at least occasionally (and 
possibly unintentionally) to portray securitization as an intellectual process. Thus, they 
repeatedly characterized the securitizing move as the making of an ‘argument’ or ‘argue[ing]’, 
which the Oxford Dictionary Online defines as ‘give reasons or cite evidence in support of an 
idea, action, or theory, typically with the aim of persuading others to share one’s view’.48 Buzan 
and Wæver, moreover, alluded to ‘processes’ whereby securitizing actors and audiences 
construct a ‘shared understanding’ of the threat and they associated the acceptance of a 
securitizing argument by an audience with its becoming ‘convinced’ by the argument.49 These 
formulations evoke an image of an auditorium in which the securitizing actors lecture from the 
podium while the audience listens passively in its seats. Furthermore, the use of terms like 
‘argument’, ‘understanding’, and ‘convince’ implies that the interaction between the actors and 
their audience operates more on an intellectual level than on a more complex linguistic-material 
assemblage.    
 We have argued earlier that the securitizing move involves the spouting forth of 
ambiguous, simplified phrases more than the communication of arguments. Here, we want to 
propose that, just as the securitizing move should not be solely understood in terms of arguing—
‘give reasons or cite evidence in support of an idea . . .’—so should audience acceptance not be 
conceptualized in terms of intellectual persuasion or understanding.50 Audience acceptance, we 
contend, is better understood in terms of belief: ‘an acceptance that something exists or is true, 
especially one without proof” or ‘trust, faith, or confidence in someone or something’.51 Belief or 
                                                      
48 Ibid. The Oxford Dictionary is available at: {http://oxforddictionaries.com/}, accessed 15 September 
2012, emphases added.  
49 Buzan et. al., Ibid., pp. 26, 41, emphasis added. See also Buzan and Hansen, Evolution of International 
Security Studies, p. 34. 
50 Oxford Dictionary Online. 
51 Oxford Dictionary Online, emphases added. 
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 believing is at the core of the religious experience and practice. It is a concept typically 
associated with faith and practice as much as with facts or reason. 
 Our claim that audience acceptance often includes more than intellectual persuasion is 
partly informed by the recent ‘practice turn’ in IR. This work was largely initiated by Neumann’s 
contention that discursive approaches put too much emphasis on language at the expense of 
incorporating other kinds of social actions and lived experiences of agents.52 Perhaps the major 
claim of the practice literature is that ‘it is not only who we are that drives what we do; it is also 
what we do that determines who we are’.53 As Neumann argues, practice theory focuses on 
‘material patterns of action that are organized around the common implicit understandings’ and 
as such entails the background knowledge that actors habitually reply upon in their actions.54  In 
this sense, there are few aspects of practices that we build upon here.  First, a practice is ‘a 
performance—that is, a process of doing something’.55 Processes of ’doing something’ here are 
viewed as socially significant and meaningful performances that can both uphold and subtly 
redefine socially constructed understandings. Second, practices bring together both the discursive 
and the material aspects of interaction. Practices require language to articulate social meaning, 
and they entail material enactments that manipulate and change the physical world and collective 
understandings about the world.56   
                                                      
52 Iver B. Neumann, ‘Returning Practice to the Linguistic Turn: The Case of Diplomacy’, Millennium: 
Journal of International Studies, 31:3 (2002), pp. 627–51. 
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  A key contribution of IR practice research is precisely in its drawing together of the 
material and the ideational in a framework that allows for nuanced analyses of meaning-making. 
Yet, practice theory’s downplaying of the temporal dimension in the functioning of speech acts 
is precisely how we supplement practice approaches here. The notion of ‘condensed historicity’ 
discussed above helpfully draws out the theoretical significance of the temporality of the 
illocutionary act, thereby conceptualizing the act more in terms of a process in time. We argue 
that the ritualized uttering of phrases such as ‘WMD’ is a condition of their performativity. The 
more frequently a securitizing phrase (with ultimately contestable meaning) is repeated—the  
more condensed its ‘historicity’ becomes—the more likely is the phrase to acquire a processual 
illocutionary force and cohere into a securitized threat. The political aspects of the materiality of 
practices can be helpfully analyzed through the repetitive elements of ritual. We argue that 
securitization succeeds to the extent that the audience itself comes to participate in the 
performance in a ritualized chanting and repetition of the securitizing discourse. In this sense, we 
argue that securitization efforts and audience beliefs about threats can be more effectively 
analyzed by conceptualizing the interplay between the temporality of illocutionary acts, practices 
as performances, and the materiality of the body.  The ‘condensed historicity’ of the securitizing 
effort is materially inscribed in the performances of speakers and audiences.  Consequently, the 
particular temporality of the speech act is the condition of possibility of meaningful material 
performances of speakers and audiences. 
 Let us return now to our argument that audience acceptance is best understood in terms of 
belief.  A standard way of thinking about beliefs is to view them as attributes of human subjects, 
attributes that precede and guide the subject’s practical actions: I believe that the existing 
political order is good, hence I regularly cast votes, dutifully pay taxes, sing the national anthem, 
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 and so on. Or, I believe that country X is a ‘rogue state’ and I thus voice my support for military 
intervention. But a more compelling (to us at least) way of conceptualizing beliefs is to invert the 
above formula: I practice, thus I believe. This inversion is a central theme of Louis Althusser’s 
theory of ideology. Challenging extant conceptions of ideology—conceptions that characterized 
ideas, distorted though they might be, as prior to human action—Althusser argued that in fact 
‘the “ideas” of a human subject exist in his actions’, and that these actions are ‘inserted into 
practices’, which, in turn, are ‘governed by’ and ‘inscribed’ in ‘rituals’.57 As Butler pointed out, 
‘Althusser’s insistence that ideology has a “ritual” form’ is a ‘counterpart’ of ‘Austin’s view that 
the illocutionary speech act is conditioned by its conventional, that is, “ritual” or “ceremonial” 
dimension’.58 
 Althusser acknowledged a debt to Pascal for his ‘wonderful’ formulation of the inverted 
relationship between belief and practice. Pascal, according to Althusser, ‘says more or less: 
“Kneel down, move your lips in prayer, and you will believe”’. For Pascal (and Althusser), then, 
belief is not an intellectual choice that precedes the practicing of religious rituals. Belief is rather 
inscribed in and enacted by these rituals—it is in the repeated performance of verbal and non-
verbal practices that one becomes a believer. This formulation may have ‘scandal[ized]’ the 
Catholic Church during Pascal’s lifetime and it may remain anathema to the Church today, but 
believers/practitioners of other faiths would not necessarily find Pascal’s position offensive.59 
Judaism, for example, ‘has historically been a religion of law and hence practice’.60 As 
University of Chicago divinity professor Michael Fishbane explained, ‘In traditional Judaism all 
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 aspects of life are ritualized through halakhic [Jewish law] regulations—from the first thought 
and prayer in the morning through the final prayers upon one’s bed at night’. These daily rituals   
dramatize the ideology of Judaism in concrete forms. And it is just these forms that give 
the beliefs and attitudes of Judaism their daily texture, their lived quality. . . . Indeed, the 
beliefs of Judaism become present each day through the prayers, study, and life actions of 
the Jew. . . . There is thus no abstract affirmation of faith in Judaism. Rather, one 
performs the halakha and, through it, affirms Jewish values and ideals.61   
 
The similarity between this account of the performativity of Judaism and Pascal’s (and 
Althusser’s) formula—pray and you will believe—is striking indeed.   
 While many Jewish rituals are non-verbal, the recitation of liturgical texts is an integral 
part of Jewish practice. An observant Jew does not only repeat—indeed chant—the same prayers 
day in and day out, he chants certain phrases multiple times within each individual prayer. Of 
course, neither the repetitiveness of the liturgy nor the incorporation of musical forms into prayer 
services is unique to Judaism. Linguist Julia Bamford noted that the liturgies of most religions 
‘rely on repetition to create incantatory rhythms’.62 And anthropologist Robin Sylvan observed 
that ‘music and religion are intimately linked in almost every culture and in almost every 
historical period.’63 To cite a few examples, rhythmic chanting accompanied by drums is an 
integral aspect of shamanist traditions. The chanting of mantras is a central practice in all forms 
of Buddhism as is the chanting of Qur’anic verses in Islam’s daily prayers. And hymns are 
incorporated into ‘Christian liturgy in a myriad of forms, from the solemn tones of Gregorian 
chant to . . . the African American styling of gospel choirs’.64  
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  As anthropologist Richard Jones explained, chanting is a ‘linguistic act’ that functions 
both to foster group solidarity (more on which later) and to affect individual minds. At the 
individual level, ‘Anyone who has ever repeated the same word over and over again has noticed 
that any repeated word, or string of words, eventually seems to become strange and 
meaningless’. Chanting thus has the capacity ‘to put the mind beyond words and into an altered 
state of consciousness in order to, for example, achieve enlightenment, to personally experience 
God, or to enter into the spirit world’.65 Through chanting—whether it takes place in a house of 
worship or in secular venues such as music clubs or football stadiums—individual minds may 
possibly come to transcend reality, ‘experiencing a powerful form of virtual reality’.66      
 Furthermore, chanting, like all music, affects the human body as well as the mind. The 
truth of Nietzsche’s saying that ‘we listen to music with our muscles’ is readily evident when 
music moves us to sway our bodies, ‘tap our feet, . . . “keep time”, hum, sing along or 
“conduct”’.67 Chanting even affects our brains in involuntary ways. The words of simple, 
endlessly repeated popular songs/chants become lodged in our memory even if we did not care to 
remember them.68 And ‘all of us have experienced the involuntary, helpless mental replaying of 
songs or tunes’, sometimes called ‘”earworms”, for they may burrow into us, entrench 
themselves and then perseverate internally hundreds of times a day’.69   
*   *   * 
 Let us now return to securitization theory and draw upon the above theoretical ideas to 
elucidate ‘audience acceptance’. The audience is not akin to students in an academic lecture hall 
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 or to theatergoers who are mostly performed to. Instead, securitization succeeds to the extent that 
the audience comes to participate in the performance in a manner more characteristic of music 
club goers or worshippers in sanctuaries where chanting and music play a central role. 
Securitization succeeds when the ‘mantras’ repeated by securitizing actors in speeches and news 
releases jump to the pages of the print media, skip into the wording of frequently-asked and 
widely-reported opinion poll questions, reverberate through talk shows, news broadcasts and 
other electronic media programming, echo throughout the blogosphere, and, increasingly in 
recent years, flood the social media. Mediated by these media forms, the securitizing phrase 
infiltrates and even infects everyday talk, including, for example, dinner party conversations, 
chatter around office water coolers, and discussions in school and college classrooms. The 
utterances of the securitizing actors and the audience thus combine into a chorus, a collective 
chant that, though it is performed in time, constitutes a single linguistic event.   
 The audience, moreover, should not solely be understood as a passive receiver of 
securitizing arguments who then decides whether these arguments are logically or factually 
valid. Audience members cannot quite check the accuracy of the securitizing phrases they hear 
because, as we will discuss further below, these phrases are typically ambiguous (what exactly is 
a ‘rogue state’? a ‘weapon of mass destruction’?) and new to most people (how many people 
were familiar with ‘ethnic cleansing’ before it became a stock phrase in the 1990s?). We propose 
that many, if not all, members of the audience rather come to believe in the alleged security 
threat in the manner theorized by Althusser: the threat comes into existence in one’s chanting of 
the phrase that ostensibly describes this threat. The phrase becomes itself the threat.  
  As the securitizing phrase echoes in people’s ears, and as they themselves join in 
repeating it, the phrase becomes materially ‘inscribed’ in people’s bodies.70 The phrase ‘burrows 
into’ audience members by becoming stuck in their memory like a refrain of a popular song, or 
even by becoming ‘entrenched’ in the brain in the form of an ‘earworm’.71 As to people’s minds, 
we do not argue that one’s participation in the society-wide chanting of securitizing phrases 
literally alters his/her consciousness in the way in which it may be altered in the course of a 
trance party or a Sufi ceremony. Still, we propose that ‘trance-formation’—the capacity of the 
rhythmic incantation of words to take the chanter’s consciousness ‘beyond words’, creating a 
virtually-real consciousness of vague yet palpable danger—is a powerful metaphor that 
elucidates the audience’s acceptance of securitizing phrases.72 This metaphor is a useful aide to 
understanding securitization in the same way that ‘drumbeat’ remains a rightly-popular 
conceptualization of war mobilization even as in contemporary society we no longer literally 
beat war drums.  
 
Political ritual and social solidarity 
 Chanting is typically performed in group settings. In addition to putting individual minds 
beyond words ‘the ultimate purpose of chanting is to express group solidarity and 
cohesiveness’.73 As Emile Durkheim wrote in 1915, ‘It is by uttering the same cry, pronouncing 
the same word, or performing the same gesture in regard to some object that [people] become 
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 and feel themselves to be in unison’. For Durkheim and subsequent generations of 
anthropologists, communal ritual activity is ‘necessary’ for creating social solidarity.74  
 In his seminal study of political rituals, anthropologist David Kertzer stressed that 
solidarity should not be equated with social harmony or political consensus. On the contrary, 
anthropologists have learned that ‘the greater the divisiveness in society, the greater the need for 
compensatory ritual to hold the society together’.75 The genius of ritual lies precisely in fostering 
a sense of unity in the absence of political or social consensus. Ritual ‘can promote social 
solidarity without implying that people share the same values, or even the same interpretation of 
the ritual’.76 Take, for example, the US Constitution, which Max Lerner once called the 
‘American totem’. The invocation of the Constitution in public life serves as a ‘unifying national 
force’ even as many Americans are at best dimly familiar with the content of the document and 
even as deep political divisions surround the interpretation of key parts of the Constitution.77 
Similarly, when a crowd in a sports arena rises to chant the national anthem, the communal 
singing fosters a feeling of oneness even as the partisan preferences and inner attitudes of 
individual spectators may be significantly divergent, with some chanters expressing deep-seated 
patriotic values, others singing mechanically as their thoughts wander in various directions, and 
yet others who might inwardly scorn the ritual but take part in it to avoid disapproving stares. By 
the same token, when a securitizing phrase ‘catches fire’, echoing throughout the media and 
skipping into everyday talk, the emergent chorus produces a general ‘atmosphere of strangeness, 
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 danger, and fear’ even as the chanters may not share the same political values and even as some 
of them may oppose the policies promoted by the securitizing actors.78 In fact, when opponents 
of securitization incorporate the securitizing phrase into their speech—stating, for example, that 
‘our country has no business intervening in “failed states”’—they participate in the choral 
chanting of the phrase all the same; they thus contribute to the consolidation of a generalized 
atmosphere of threat in the same manner that absent-minded or reluctant chanters of the anthem 
still contribute to the crowd’s sense of cohesion.79   
  Kertzer explained that the capacity of political rituals to build solidarity in the absence of 
consensus is rooted in the ambiguity of the symbols whose repetition makes up these rituals.  
‘WMD’, as illustrated below, is an example of an ambiguous symbol. As we have detailed 
elsewhere,80 the meaning of ‘WMD’ has shifted over time, and this unfixed meaning has opened 
the phrase up as a site of political contestation, allowing for its repetition across diverse 
audiences. Kertzer’s emphasis on ambiguity in ritual closely parallels the concept of the ‘empty 
signifier’ from a discourse-theoretical perspective. Empty signifiers are terms that have no 
‘intrinsic’ meaning and thus their meaning is unable to be fully pinned down, yet it is this 
ambiguity that opens them up as sites of contestations. This unfixity is in fact necessary for their 
contestability in the first place and their historicity.81   
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 The ambiguity of symbols such as ‘WMD’ derives, according to Kertzer, from two 
common properties of ritual symbolism: condensation of meaning and multivocality. 
Condensation denotes the way in which symbols bring together a rich diversity of ideas.82 
Consider, for example, the term ‘axis of evil’, which the George W. Bush administration coined 
in 2002 in reference to Iraq, Iran, and North Korea. Not only did this symbol lump together three 
countries that differ from each other in many ways, it also packed into three short words two 
loaded concepts, one fraught with religious significance, the other evocative of the heroic 
struggle against Fascism.    
 Partly because of their condensation, ritual symbols tend to be multivocal. Multiple 
meanings become attached to the same symbol so that ‘the same symbol may be understood by 
different people in different ways’.83 For example, attentive news consumers  may have 
understood that the ‘axis of evil’, as invoked by the Bush administration, referred to the three 
above-mentioned countries but many Americans may not have acquired a clear idea of who 
exactly the phrase referred to, while yet other Americans may have associated the term with 
other regimes. Furthermore, while for many Americans, especially Republicans, the phrase came 
to represent the vigor and resoluteness of the administration’s foreign policy, for other 
Americans it may have represented unnecessary swagger and immoderation.   
 The complexity and uncertainty of securitizing phrases thus make it possible for them to 
be adopted and chanted by people who do not share political values and who do not see eye to 
eye on the securitization of the issue at stake. Notwithstanding the lack of political consensus, as 
long as these people are, in Durkheim’s words, ‘uttering the same cry, pronouncing the same 
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 word . . . in regard to some object’ they partake in fostering a shared sense of danger surrounding 
this object, thus securitizing the object.    
 The implication of this insight for empirical analyses of securitization is that, in gauging 
the audience’s acceptance of the securitizing message, we should not necessarily expect to find 
evidence that the public has come to be of one mind with regard to the policies favored by the 
securitizing actors. Observing that a significant number of people express doubts or even oppose 
these policies is perfectly compatible with securitization so long as the doubters/opponents join 
in the ritualistic uttering of the securitizing phrase. Securitization ‘is produced by people acting 
[chanting] together, not by people thinking together’.84  
  
An illustration: WMD and the securitization of Iraq 
 During 2002 and early 2003 Iraq had become securitized in the United States, that is, the 
Iraqi regime has been designated by the Bush administration and a ‘significant audience’ as ‘an 
existential threat requiring emergency action or special measures’.85 In March 2003 the Bush 
administration took the special measure of invading Iraq.  
 The central theme of the administration’s securitization campaign was the danger of Iraqi 
‘weapons of mass destruction’. Beginning with the January 2002 State of the Union address, 
President Bush and senior administration officials uttered this phrase multiple times in most of 
their public appearances.86 For example, on March 24, 2002, Vice President Dick Cheney 
appeared on three major television programs to express deep concerns about, as he told CNN, 
‘the development of weapons of mass destruction by Saddam Hussein, his refusal to comply with 
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 the UN Security Council Resolution 687, . . . which said he would get rid of all his weapons of 
mass destruction’.87    
  In August 2002 the White House was put on the defensive by a growing opposition 
galvanized by an op-ed article in the Wall Street Journal. Titled ‘Don’t Bomb Saddam’, the 
article was authored by former National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft, a confidante of the 
president’s father.88  To regain momentum, White House Chief of Staff Andrew Card convened a 
high-level group whose ‘mission was to market a war in Iraq’.89 Although the formation of this 
group—the White House Iraq Group (WHIG)—was not made public, Card hinted at its task on 
September 6, 2002, when he told the New York Times that ‘From a marketing point of view, you 
don’t introduce new products in August’.90  
 Among the members of the WHIG were several specialists in strategic communication, 
including the president’s senior political advisor, Karl Rove. In a remarkably candid comment he 
made to journalist Ron Suskind, Rove  
said that guys like me [Suskind] were ‘in what we call the reality-based community,’ 
which he defined as people who ‘believe that solutions emerge from your judicious study 
of discernible reality’.' . . . ‘'That's not the way the world really works anymore’,' he 
continued. ‘We're an empire now, and when we act, we create our own reality. And while 
you're studying that reality— judiciously, as you will—we’ll act again, creating other 
new realities, which you can study too, and that's how things will sort out. We're history's 
actors . . . and you, all of you, will be left to just study what we do’.91 
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 It is unclear whether he ever studied the philosophy of language, but Rove’s comment surely 
evinced a solid grasp of the concepts of social construction and speech acts.  
 The WHIG coordinated ‘a dramatic public relations offensive to sell the American public 
on the war’.92 On the first day of the offensive, Sunday, September 8, the Group planted in the 
New York Times a ‘carefully constructed’ double metaphor that National Security Advisor 
Condoleezza Rice echoed on CNN: ‘we don’t want the smoking gun to be a mushroom cloud’.93   
In the CNN appearance in which she debuted the ‘mushroom cloud’ metaphor, Rice also uttered 
‘weapons of mass destruction’ 13 times.94 In a televised prime time speech he gave in Cincinnati 
on October 7, 2002, President Bush alluded to ‘weapons of mass destruction’ eight times in 26 
minutes.95 A shorter speech Bush delivered in Fort Hood, Texas, on January 3, 2003, contained 
as many utterances of this expression, packing five of them into a short paragraph:    
The Iraqi regime has used weapons of mass destruction. They not only had weapons of 
mass destruction, they used weapons of mass destruction. They used weapons of mass 
destruction in other countries, they have used weapons of mass destruction on their own 
people. That’s why I say Iraq is a threat, a real threat.96  
 
A month later, Secretary of State Colin Powell repeated the term 17 times in his widely-watched 
address to the UN Security Council.97   
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  In sum, the incessant repetition of the phrase ‘weapons of mass destruction’ was a central 
aspect of the Bush administration’s campaign to securitize Iraq. Senator Lincoln Chafee of 
Rhode Island, the only Republican senator who opposed the war, was hardly exaggerating when 
he later complained that the administration’s case for invading Iraq consisted in a ‘steady 
drumbeat of weapons of mass destruction, weapons of mass destruction, weapons of mass 
destruction’.98  The conjunction of this phrase with other ominous tropes such as ‘mushroom 
cloud’ only reinforced the imagery that ‘WMD’ itself evoked.   
 It did not take long for Congressional leaders to amplify the administration’s drumbeat. 
On September 4, 2002, Dick Gephardt, the leader of the Democratic minority in the House of 
Representatives, advised President Bush to dramatize the Iraqi threat to the American people. 
‘It’s about weapons of mass destruction getting in the wrong hands’, Gephardt said; the 
American people ‘don’t see it. We have to do everything in our power to keep WMD from going 
off. We need to make it graphic’.99 Shortly thereafter the phrase began reverberating through 
Congress as its members were debating a resolution authorizing the war. For example, on 
October 8, 2002 John Kerry, a Massachusetts Democrat, declared on the Senate floor that he 
would support the resolution because ‘a deadly arsenal of weapons of mass destruction in 
[Saddam Hussein’s] hands is a threat, and a grave threat, to our security’.100  
 The insertion of ‘weapons of mass destruction’ into opinion poll questions was another 
avenue through which this phrase spread from official to public discourse. For example, 
beginning in February 2002 the Gallup organization regularly included in its surveys the 
question: ‘Do you think Iraq currently has weapons of mass destruction, is trying to develop 
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 these weapons but does not currently have them, or is not trying to develop weapons of mass 
destruction?’.101 As much as such questions registered preexisting opinion, their very inclusion in 
widely-reported polls shaped public opinion by naturalizing the notion that Iraqi ‘weapons of 
mass destruction’ were an urgent security problem.102   
 Soon enough ‘weapons of mass destruction’ became a daily staple of the US press. As 
figure 1 illustrates, the frequency with which the Wall Street Journal printed this phrase was 
virtually zero in the 1980s and moderate in the 1990s before spiking dramatically in 2002 and 
2003.103 A similar pattern was characteristic of other leading newspapers. In the New York 
Times, for example, the frequency of articles in which this phrase appeared took off from 60 in 
2000 to 524 in 2002 and 853 in 2003 (in many of these articles the phrase appeared more than 
once). Figure 2, moreover, demonstrates that during the twelve months preceding the invasion of 
Iraq the incidence of ‘weapons of mass destruction’ in leading US press publications has 
increased almost tenfold. Much of this increase coincided with the launching of the 
government’s marketing campaign in early September 2002. In the seven month period 
bracketed by this event and the outbreak of the war, the phrase appeared on average in 100 
articles per month in the New York Times, compared with an average of 27 articles per month 
during the preceding seven months.   
<<< Figures 1 and 2 about here >>> 
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  No sooner than it flooded the US media, the phrase ‘weapons of mass destruction’ 
invaded the everyday talk of ordinary Americans. This linguistic invasion was powerfully if 
indirectly evidenced by the fact that the American Dialect Society (ADS) selected the phrase as 
its 2002 ‘Word of the Year’, that is, the year’s most ‘newly prominent or notable’ vocabulary 
item.104 To put it in perspective, recent Word of the Year selections included ‘bailout’ (2008), 
‘tweet’ (2009), ‘app’ (2010), and ‘occupy’ (2011). Wordsmith Ben Zimmer, who co-presided 
over the 2011 selection process, said that ‘The [Occupy] movement itself was powered by the 
word’.105 Likewise, the 2002 Word of the Year can be said to have powered, indeed embodied, 
the securitization of Iraq.  
*    *    * 
 In commercial marketing, ‘the most unforgettable catchphrases’ are characterized by 
brevity; when such phrases ‘initially haven’t been so simple, someone inevitably has stepped in 
to shorten them. Just ask the makers of the Macintosh (“Mac”) computer . . . Federal Express is 
now officially “FedEx”, Kentucky Fried Chicken is now “KFC”’.106 Indeed, just as these 
corporations have profited from the abridgment of their brand names, so has the marketing of the 
Iraq war to the American people benefitted from the abbreviation of the flabby ‘weapons of mass 
destruction’ into a trim acronym. As figure 3 indicates, whereas the acronym WMD almost never 
appeared in America’s major newspapers in the 1990s, during the lead-up to the Iraq War the 
same publications printed this abbreviation hundreds of times. Furthermore, as the war 
approached, the acronym became so common that reporters and commentators no longer felt 
compelled to spell it out. The drumbeat became peppier: WMD, WMD, WMD.  
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 <<< Figure 3 about here >>> 
 As Herbert Marcuse explained in a lucid ‘note on abridgment’, at the same time that 
abbreviations perform the ‘perfectly reasonable’ function of simplifying speech or prose, their 
use also performs an inconspicuous rhetorical function: ‘help[ing] to repress undesired 
questions’. For example, ‘NATO does not suggest what North Atlantic Treaty Organization says, 
namely a treaty among the nations on the North Atlantic—in which case one might ask questions 
about the membership of Greece and Turkey. . . . DDR [elides] democratic. UN dispenses with 
undue emphasis on “united”’.107 In keeping with Marcuse’s analysis, we note that the 
popularization of WMD helped ‘repress undesired questions’ surrounding administration 
statements such as (in President Bush’s words) ‘They used weapons of mass destruction in other 
countries, they have used weapons of mass destruction on their own people’. Because WMD 
elides the words ‘mass destruction’, the growing prominence of the abbreviation in public 
discourse made it less likely that audience members would stop their chanting to ask questions 
like: can poison gas—the weapon that the above statement interchanged ‘weapons of mass 
destruction’ for—truly cause ‘mass destruction’ even as gas cannot destroy property? Did the gas 
the Iraqi regime use against ‘its own people’ actually cause ‘mass destruction’? Could the 
employment of chemical weapons by Iraq truly pose a grave danger to the security of the United 
States? To borrow Marcuse’s words again, ‘Once [WMD] has become an official vocable, 
constantly repeated in general usage, “sanctioned” by the intellectuals, it has lost all cognitive 
value and serve[d] merely for recognition of an unquestionable fact’.108   
*    *    * 
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  While the bureaucrats and defense intellectuals who ‘constantly repeated’ this ‘official 
vocable’ may have shared a specific understanding of the meaning of WMD, this meaning was 
not necessarily shared by ordinary Americans. In fact, many Americans had barely heard the 
term ‘weapons of mass destruction’ before 2002. In November 1997, against the backdrop of 
growing tensions surrounding the weapons inspection regime in Iraq, Newsweek senior editor 
Jonathan Alter admitted that ‘until recently’ he ‘didn’t know’ the meaning of WMD. He 
proceeded to explain that WMD was ‘bureaucratic shorthand widely known inside the 
government, but right now it’s barely a blip in the public consciousness’.109 In the same vein, 
Michael Kinsley pointed out in 2003 that ‘The term [weapons of mass destruction] is a new one 
to almost everybody, and the concern it officially embodies was on almost no one’s radar screen 
until recently’.110 
 That many of Americans did not have an unambiguous picture of WMD in their head 
cannot entirely be attributed to intellectual laziness, for even if they were sufficiently curious to 
suspend the incantation of the phrase in order to search for its ‘true’, precise meaning, they 
would have had difficulty finding it. To summarize a detailed history of the phrase that we 
present elsewhere, when ‘weapons of mass destruction’ first appeared in diplomatic documents 
and the US press in November 1945, it had no clear definition.111 In subsequent arms control 
negotiations diplomats and commentators have debated a wide range of definitions before the 
UN Commission on Conventional Armament resolved in 1948 that the WMD category included 
atomic, radiological, biological, and chemical weapons, as well as future weapons capable of 
comparable destruction. During the Cold War, however, the phrase gradually receded from 
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 public view and, to the extent that it has been mentioned in the US press, it was typically 
associated with nuclear weapons alone; for example, in contrast with president Bush’s statement 
in 2003 that ‘The Iraqi regime has used weapons of mass destruction’, the US press did not 
employ this term in the 1980s in its reporting on Iraq’s use of poison gas. In the 1990s the phrase 
made a minor comeback into foreign policy discourse as a result of its incorporation into the 
1991 Security Council resolution that imposed an arms inspection regime on Iraq. At the same 
time, however, the phrase jumped into the language of domestic US anti-crime legislation, where 
it was defined in far broader terms than those of the UN’s 1948 definition (including, for 
example, any conventional ‘bomb, grenade, rocket having a propellant charge of more than four 
ounces’). Based on this law federal prosecutors have regularly pressed WMD charges not only 
against terrorism suspects such as ‘shoe bomber’ Richard Reid but also in cases involving petty 
domestic crime. For instance, a short time after the US invaded Iraq to remove the existential 
threat of WMD, a Pennsylvania man was sent to prison for mailing his former doctor a ‘weapon 
of mass destruction’ assembled from ‘black gunpowder, a carbon dioxide cartridge, a nine-volt 
battery, a model rocket igniter, and dental floss’.112  
 ‘Weapons of mass destruction,” then, possesses the typical properties of political ritual 
symbols.113 First, it condenses into three words, or even three letters, multiple weapon systems 
that ‘are fundamentally different in terms of lethality’, as well as the iconic image of the atomic 
mushroom cloud.114 Second, it is ambiguous. Throughout its history the meaning of the phrase 
‘weapons of mass destruction’ has been contested, changeable, and, to most Americans, obscure. 
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 Finally, ‘weapon of mass destruction’ is multivocal. It has had multiple meanings and it has 
meant different things to different people.  
 As we discussed earlier, these properties allow the ritualized repetition of political 
symbols to foster a sense of social oneness in the absence of political consensus. The Iraq War 
was a divisive issue in American politics and a sizable minority of Americans adamantly 
opposed the invasion. Yet the chanting of WMD, WMD, WMD, transcended the political divide 
as opponents of the war embraced the term, repeating it reflexively and uncritically. For 
example, speaking on the same news program in which Condoleezza Rice debuted the 
‘mushroom cloud’ metaphor, Senator Bob Graham (Democrat, Florida), who would later vote 
against authorizing the war, uttered ‘weapons of mass destruction’ seven times. Similarly, IR 
scholars John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt, both outspoken critics of the Iraq war, repeated 
the phrase six times in an op-ed article in the New York Times.115  
 By joining the chorus chanting ‘WMD’, the opponents of the war helped consolidate a 
generalized atmosphere of danger, thus contributing to the securitization of Iraq, even as, on the 
intellectual level, they were not persuaded by the Bush administration’s case for war. With the 
caveat that, as we noted earlier, polls shape public opinion as much as they register it, it is 
nonetheless significant that, when Americans were asked by pollsters whether they supported or 
opposed the use of force against Iraq, ‘the results were exceptionally consistent’ over time.116 In 
survey after survey conducted throughout 2002 and early 2003, just under sixty percent of the 
respondents expressed support for an invasion while just over a third of them indicated 
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 opposition.117 Remarkably, these levels of support/opposition were recorded by pollsters even 
before the focus of the administration’s rhetoric shifted from Afghanistan to Iraq. Equally 
remarkably, the launching of the administration’s war marketing campaign in September 2002 
made virtually no dent in this pattern. There is little evidence, then, that the administration’s 
‘argument’ for war ‘convinced’ the American people to change their minds about the Iraqi threat. 
The securitization of Iraq was made successful not by ‘people thinking together’ so much as by 
people chanting together: WMD, WMD, WMD.118  
 We conclude this section with a passage penned by columnist Michael Kinsley in June 
2003.  
By now, WMD have taken on a mythic role in which fact doesn't play much of a part. 
The phrase itself—‘weapons of mass destruction’—is more like an incantation than a 
description of anything in particular. The term is a new one to almost everybody, and the 
concern it officially embodies was on almost no one’s radar screen until recently. 
Unofficially, “weapons of mass destruction” are to George W. Bush what fairies were to 
Peter Pan. He wants us to say, ‘We DO believe in weapons of mass destruction. We DO 
believe. We DO’. If we all believe hard enough, they will be there. And it's working.119 
  
Kinsley’s observation, though it is not stated in theoretical language (or perhaps because it is 
not), forcefully captures the logic of our argument on WMD and the securitization of Iraq.  
 
Conclusion 
 What are the implications of our argument for activists, scholars, or other ‘audience 
members’ who wish to oppose a move to securitize an issue? Can opponents of securitization 
avoid uttering the central phrase of a securitization campaign? If not, what can they do to resist 
securitization?  These are difficult questions that some students of securitization have wrestled 
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 with. Huysmans, for example, recognized a ‘dilemma’ for securitization researchers who wish to 
avoid securitizing the issue at hand.120 If we accept the performative power of language, there is 
the possibility that the securitization scholars’ very writing will contribute to the securitization 
processes under study. Moreover, it remains unclear how to negotiate this tension. On one hand, 
even as it demonstrates the contingency and historicity of a securitization effort, critical 
scholarship ‘does not necessarily undermine the real effects’ of such discourse.121 On the other 
hand, arguing that securitization discourses ‘distort’ the ‘reality’ of security politics denies the 
performative power of language and thus renders the securitization approach epistemologically 
inconsistent.122 Although maintaining reflective awareness of this tension is necessary, 
Huysmans argues that there is ultimately no solution to this dilemma—this approach to language 
‘makes any security utterance potentially securitizing’.123 
While we find Huysmans’s analysis perceptive, we propose that following Butler here 
can lead to a potentially more promising strategy of engagement. In her analysis of injurious 
speech acts, Butler pointed out that “no one has ever worked through an injury without repeating 
it; . . . There is no possibility of not repeating” the words of hateful speech even as our goal is to 
combat that speech.124 By the same token, it may not be possible to combat a securitizing speech 
act without repeating the words ourselves. It may not be possible, for example, to entirely avoid 
uttering the words ‘weapons of mass destruction’ in pushing back against a securitization 
campaign centered on the spouting of this very phrase.    
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  The question, then, is not if but how we should repeat the securitizing phrase. Are we 
going to repeat the phrase reflexively, thus naturalizing it and reproducing the meaning that the 
securitizing actors sought to attach to the phrase? Are we going to incorporate the phrase into an 
intellectual rebuttal to the argument made by the securitizing actors? This is what the many 
scholars and commentators who have opposed the Iraq war have done, with limited success. 
They basically saw themselves as participants in a ‘marketplace of ideas’, where their role was to 
‘weed out unfounded, mendacious . . . arguments’.125 They failed to see that the administration’s 
securitizing move was not, in Karl Rove’s words, ‘reality-based’ so much as reality-creating. By 
reflexively repeating the key utterances of the administration’s marketing campaign they 
unintentionally helped consolidate the reality—the sense of a grave Iraqi menace—that the 
administration sought to construct.    
 A more effective strategy for combating the marketing of security threats would begin by 
recognizing, following Derrida, that repeating a term ‘never simply produce a replica of the 
original usage’—every repetition potentially ‘transforms meaning, adds to it’.126 Indeed, 
ambiguous and multivocal catchphrases are particularly amenable to such a transformation of 
meaning. As Butler explained with regard to injurious utterances, their ‘equivocality’ means that 
such utterances ‘might not always mean in the same way, that [their] meaning might be turned or 
derailed in some significant way . . . The disjuncture between utterance and meaning is the 
condition of possibility for revising the performative, of the performative as the repetition of its 
prior instance, a repetition that is at once a reformulation’.127 The ‘revaluation’ of the word 
‘queer’—a term that used to be exclusively derogatory before being appropriated as a term of 
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 pride—is a notable example of a successful ‘repetition that is at once a reformulation.’128 Similar 
reformulations of injurious speech have occurred in the realm of the arts, including, notably, the 
resignification of racist epithets in their repetition by rap artists.129   
 Butler further points out that the repetition of a word in the aesthetic realm   
may both use the word and mention it, that is, make use of it to produce certain effects 
but also at the same time make reference to that very use, calling attention to it as a 
citation, situating that use within a citational legacy, making that use into an explicit 
discursive item to be reflected on rather than a taken-for-granted operation of ordinary 
language. Or, it may be that an aesthetic reenactment uses that word but also displays it, 
points to it, outlines it as the arbitrary material instance of language that is exploited to 
produce certain kinds of effects.130  
 
In keeping with this insight, we propose that, rather than repeat the utterances of securitizing 
actors exclusively in the context of a debate over ideas, opponents of securitization may want to 
shift their efforts to the aesthetic plane. And rather than repeat the phrase primarily in ‘serious’ 
outlets such as op-ed pages or news programs, opponents should consider repeating it in arts and 
entertainment venues or forms. Mock the word by repeating it mechanically in comedy acts;  
incorporate it into rap songs and faux poems; turn the word into the butt of jokes on late night 
television shows; parody the uttering of the word in blog posts; repeat it in satirical writing.   
 Consider, for example, a March 2004 episode of the TV mob drama The Sopranos. In this 
episode, a character is asked by the authorities to open his garage, which is suspected of 
containing illegal materials. ‘That’s where I make my weapons of mass destruction’, he 
wisecracks, trying to distract the officer.131 Similarly, a 2006 episode of The Simpsons featured a 
plot where aliens used the claim that humans were manufacturing ‘weapons of mass 
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 disintegration’ as an excuse to invade Earth.132 These episodes hint at the kinds of efforts 
Butler’s analysis suggests—re-signifying ‘WMD’ in the realm of popular culture in order to 
undermine the political efficacy of this securitizing phrase.   
 Michael Kinsley’s above-quoted satire (‘”weapons of mass destruction” are to George W. 
Bush what fairies were to Peter Pan. He wants us to say, "We DO believe in weapons of mass 
destruction. We DO believe. We DO”’), too, was an exemplar of Butler’s ‘aesthetic 
reenactment’. Kinsley used the phrase WMD repeatedly at the same time that he put it on 
display, nudging the reader to reflect on the phrase’s arbitrariness and the way in which it was 
‘exploited to produce certain kinds of effects’.133 Indeed, in light of the key factor of repetition 
that is central to ongoing securitization efforts, attempts like these (and the popular culture 
instances above) did succeed to an extent in challenging the dominant discourse as the war 
progressed.  Yet, Kinsley’s piece, like the aforementioned TV episodes, was published after the 
invasion of Iraq.  Earlier aesthetic reenactments of ‘weapons of mass destruction’ were 
ultimately attempted too little, too late to counteract the successful securitization of Iraq in the 
run-up to war.    
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Figure 1: Frequency of “Weapons of Mass 
Destruction” in the Wall Street Journal, 1980-2003
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Figure 2: Monthly Frequencies of “Weapons of 
Mass Destruction” in Major U.S. Publications 
During the Run-Up to War
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